Pfeiffer Nuclear Weapon And National Security Archive

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Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation
for the Pantex Facility: Building 12-66 (U)

Westinghouse Savannah River Company
Criticality Safety Engineering

Author: Jack S. Bullington
October 1997

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Table of Contents

1) Introduction

2) Description

Building 12-66
Building 12-79

3) Requirements Documentation

4) Methodology

5) Discussion of Contingencies

6) Evaluation of Results

Preliminary Pit Calculations
Specific Weapon Pit Calculations
Building 12-79 Loading Dock and Interlock

7) Design Features and Administrative Controlled Limits and
Requirements

8) Summary and Conclusions

9) References

10) Appendix

Appendix A - Materials and Compositions
Appendix B - Sample Input Files
Appendix C - Sample Output Files

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Westinghouse Savannah River Company
Savannah River Site
Criticality Safety Engineering

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September 30, 1997

To: Larry Skeen/Phil Stewart, Pantex Facility
From: Jack S. Bullington, 803-952-3385

Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation
for the Pantex Facility: Building 12-66 (U)

1) Introduction

A project is underway to upgrade the Pantex facility Building 12-66 to provide facilities to store approximately 12000
weapon pits in storage containers. The facility currently provides storage for miscellaneous and secondary components. As
proposed, the central fire wall, sprinkler system and the racks currently used will be removed and new racks built to the
required specifications. The old heating and ventilation system will be removed and a new system installed to provide
adequate cooling such that thermally hot pits will not significantly degrade the celotex or fiberboard packing material in the
AL-R8 containers. AL-R8 30 gallon containers loaded elsewhere with selected pits will be transferred to the Building 12-79
loading dock area, palletized into Stage Right pallets (4-packs or 6-packs), transferred to the airlock where the containers will
be rotated to horizontal by the pallet turner and then into the vault for storage by the Automated Guided Vehicle. In some
situations the loaded AL-R8 container will already be palletized prior to arrival at the Building 12-79 loading dock.

Storage racks are to be built so that containers each containing one weapon pit can be stored in an array, nominally 90
containers long, 17 containers wide, and up to 9 containers high, and can be accessed through aisles by a Automated Guided
Vehicle (AGV). Weapon pits will be contained in the AL-R8 container loaded per the AL-R8 Safety Analysis for Packaging
(Reference 6). The AL-R8 container was at one time a DOT approved shipping package fully certified for over the road
transport, but has since lost it’s certification and can only be used for storage.

Per your request, I reviewed the available documentation and performed calculations to determine the adequacy of the
facility for general storage of weapon pits in the AL-R8 Container.

This evaluation documents that all pits identified to be stored in Building 12-66 are acceptable for storage in the AL-R8
container in the proposed rack configuration.

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2) Description
Building 12-66

The Pantex facility Building 12-66 is a robust structure nominally 100 feet by 200 feet by 20 feet high with 1 foot thick
concrete walls that will be modified for pit storage. The roof is tapered from 18 inches at the apex to 1 foot concrete on the
sides. The structure is designed to withstand design basis accidents which makes it ideal for long term storage. Storage racks
will be installed to contain pallets of 30 gallon containers using the Stage Right Concept. The current container design to be
used is a Rocky Flats container AL-R8. The AT-400A container originally considered is not available at the time of this
evaluation. The storage arrangement within Building 12-66 will consist of racks that support pallets of 6 or 4 containers (6-
pack or 4-pack) laid on their sides, arranged up to three packs high, with a nominal 22 inch space between the second and
third pallet in the same tier. Racks are separated by aisles for the AGV to transfer the pallets to their respective storage
position. Some racks will be back-to-back.

Building 12-79

The loading dock of the adjacent
Building 12-79 will be used to
receive loaded AL-R8 containers
and assemble them into either
packs of 4 or 6 containers on the
Stage Right pallet. In some
situations containers will already
be assembled on the Stage Right
pallet prior to arrival on the
Building 12-79 Dock. The
Building 12-79 loading dock and
the Building 12-66 storage area
are interconnected via an
interlock. Once loaded, the
pallets are turned on their side
with a pallet turner and
transferred through the interlock
and into Building 12-66 with the
AGV.

3) Requirements Documentation

This evaluation was prepared in accordance with the guidelines of the Westinghouse Savannah River Criticality Safety
Manual (Reference 9), the WSRC Nuclear Criticality Safety Methods Manual (Reference 10) and additional guidance from
the Pantex Plant Criticality Safety Program Analysis. Inherent in the requirements of these manuals is appropriate
implementation of DOE Order 420.1 (formerly 5480.24) and ANSI/ANS-8 series national standards.

4) Methodology

Preliminary calculations were made using Hansen-Roach 16 group cross sections and the KENO V.a Monte Carlo Criticality
Safety computer code on an IBM 3090 mainframe. HRXN is part of the Savannah River Technology Center Joshua (J70)
System and KENO V.a is a well established criticality code associated with the SCALE (Reference 7) System. Subsequent
calculations were made on a DGI Pentium 90 computer using the PC version of KENO V.a and KENO VI on a compact disc.

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The 27 group cross section library \yasaisedibr.alLfinal n akula timi^Code?^^ Savannah River code

and verification system. To achieve the model

detail desired an updated version of KENO VI was used. This version allowed nested arrays to allow container grouping to
more closely represent the storage stall configuration. This code has limited validation and its results are provided for
comparison and information purposes only.

HRXN and the 27 group library provide cross sections used in KENO. Mixtures used in this study are provided in Appendix
A. KENO solves the three dimensional transport equation using statistically dependent Monte Carlo techniques and produces
the system k-effective and confidence limits about the mean k-effective. The mean value of k-effective + 3 standard
deviations (sigma) is required to be less than or equal to k-safe to maintain the safety margin. Typically, 150,000 to 270,000
neutron histories are adequate to produce a standard deviation of 0.002.

Biasing information was obtained from References 8 and 13. Reference 8 discusses fifty critical experiments with plutonium
cores and average fission energies in the mid-range between thermal and fast to determine the bias and bias uncertainty for
the 27 group ENDF/B-IV cross section libraries. These validation experiments for the plutonium/beryllium units all
calculated criticality greater than unity and provided a lower tolerance (includes the bias uncertainty) band also greater than
unity for the energy range of concern. Reference 13 identifies area of applicability (AOA) differences between single units
and arrays as negligible. Normalizing the resulting biasing data to 1.0 results in a conservative upper bound k-effective
(neutron multiplication factor) for this report of 0.95.

5) Discussion of Contingencies

To satisfy double contingency, the process must meet, as a minimum, ANS 8.1 sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3, which require that
the entire process be subcritical under both normal and credible abnormal conditions and that process operating procedures
shall specify all parameters they are intended to control. This Double Contingency Analysis identifies the areas of concerns
that may need resolution before the facility is actually operable.

Per discussions at the 26 August 1997 meeting at Pantex (Reference 11) this double contingency analysis will only identify
the areas to be considered as required for the preliminary design report and will not provide the detail that would be
normally provided in the final criticality safety evaluation/double contingency analysis .

• Each of the nine parameters that are required to be controlled for criticality safety are listed in the Parameter column and
a discussion of how it relates to the Building 12-66 facility is provided in the Discussion column.

• The Contingency column identifies a way or ways this parameter could fail but, may or may not be credible.

• The Barriers column identifies if the contingency is credible, based on engineering judgment or other means, and
controls that must be in place if the contingency is identified as credible.

Pantex Plant practices defense in depth for the parameters controlled for criticality safety and is a step beyond parameter
control. This typically drives the contingency to incredible or beyond extremely unlikely and is the reason Nuclear Incident
Monitors are not used in the facility. The term “criticality concern” is used in the discussion section to simply identify a
concern in which Pantex Risk Management would be notified and may or may not lead to a criticality scenario. The
contingencies presented here are as they relate to Building 12-79 loading dock, the interlock between the loading dock and
Building 12-66, and the Building 12-66 vault itself. Information relating to an airplane crash was extracted from Reference
12 .

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Mass Control

Mass Control
Continued

This scenario is considered
credible.

Pits in AL-R8 storage containers
are controlled by the Nuclear
Material Control Center (NMCC)
at Pantex and are tracked
continuously. Written procedures
specify which containers are to be
placed in the vault.

Procedures specify the proper
loading sequence for the AL-R8
container and require that a
support frame be used for each
pit

More than one pit supported by
the frame can not physically fit in
the container and not a credible
scenario. The Nuclear Materials
Control Center (NMCC) tracking
system & security precludes
handling more than one pit at a
time.

Fissile material other than whole
pits will not be staged in the vault.
Pantex does not handle
disassembled components, so this
would have to be a shipment from
another site. This is not a credible
scenario because procedures are
not in place to receive or transfer
other containers or other fissile
material to the vault. Receipt of
just one of these containers into
the vault would involve several
procedural violations from several
departments. Similarly, receipt of
more than one or several
unauthorized containers is also
incredible.

A container with the incorrect
identification containing a more
reactive pit is sent to the vault.

More than one pit placed in a
storage container or one pit
placed incorrectly in container
and stored in the vault.

Fissile material other than whole
pits loaded in a storage container
and taken to the vault.

Sending the incorrect container to the vault is
a credible occurrence. Even though the
tracking system is in place errors of this sort
do occur. Pits will already be contained in
approved storage containers by the time they
arrive at the 12-79 dock.

Loading more than one pit in container would
present an unstudied situation in the vault. Pits
have been place upside down but that
condition has no criticality safety
consequence.

Fissile material (from other sites) other than
whole pits could potentially be sent to Pantex.
This material stored in a 2030-1 (which is
similar to an AL-R8) has not been studied for
storage in the vault and would present an
unanalyzed situation.

Moderation

The AL-R8 has a specific amount

of celotex required at the time of
loading to qualify as an AL-R8.
Procedures specify the loading
sequence of the celotex and the
proper amount. For this to truly
create a criticality problem the
error would have to be repeated
several times and go undetected.
With the two person rule for
handling fissile material repeating

Incorrect amount of celotex is

placed in a container prior to
loading with fissile material

Having less celotex than evaluated would

negate this evaluation, increase fissile unit
interaction (cross-talk) and present a criticality
concern. However, since the AL-R8 container
as modeled is mathematically reduced in size
and quantity of celotex approximately 1/3 to
account for triangular pitch some error is
already evaluated.

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the sequence over and over is
considered to be incredible.

There are no sprinkler systems in
Building 12-66 vault area and no
other normal sources of
moderation.

Combustible material and ignition
sources are limited in the vault.

Fire crews are trained not to use
fire hoses in the vault

None Identified

Water is introduced into the vault
in quantities significant enough to
build an appreciable level in the
vault

Airplane crash into the vault area

Water could be introduced into the vault for
fire fighting purposes. A fire in the vault of
sufficient magnitude could bum the celotex in
the AL-R8 container and change the pit
configuration. A fire of this magnitude would
require an ignition source and then significant
quantities of fuel to propagate beyond the
incipient stage. This is unlikely since
significant combustible materials are not
allowed in the vault.

The celotex in the AL-R8 provides a condition
of near overmoderation. Therefore, for fires in
the incipient stage, the addition of water
would serve to isolate the pits and the vault
reactivity would decrease and approach the
reactivity of the single unit.

An airplane crash into the 12-66 or 12-79
facility in considered highly unlikely. The
impact would cause extreme structural
damage and release of radioactive material.

Fire resulting from airplane fuel would char
the celotex. Fire fighting activities would
likely involve directing water streams into the
storage area and potential localized flooding.

Geometry Control

Geometry Control
Continued

Containers other than the AL-R8

container are not currently
authorized for storage in the vault.
Procedures identify the specific
container to be used and only a 30
gallon container will fit in the

Stage Right pallet.

This is considered an incredible
event based on the current NMCC
and security controls. Pits are
already contained in approved
storage containers by the time
they arrive at the 12-79 dock.
Containers will not be opened for
any reason once they are at the
12-79 dock or in Building 12-66.

Building 12-66 and the storage
racks are seismically qualified to
withstand a DBA. Reference to be
added by Charles Hills.

None identified

A loaded container other than an

AL-R8 is sent to the vault

A bare pit is sent to the vault

Design Basis Accident (DBA)

Airplane Crash

The AL-R8 container is loaded with specific

size and shape celotex and support frame.
Changing this configuration would alter the
basis of this evaluation and present an
unstudied situation.

A bare pit would present an unstudied
scenario and would present a criticality
concern.

During a DBA loaded AL-R8 containers could
fall into the aisles, increase unit interaction
and present a criticality concern.

An airplane crash into the 12-66 or 12-79
facility in considered highly unlikely. The
impact would potentially cause extreme
structural damage, crush containers and
release of radioactive material to the
atmosphere.

Spacing

The only location that containers

are handled individually is on the

A damaged container is sent to the

vault or is damaged while in the

A damaged container could decrease the

physical spacing between adjacent fissile units

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Building 12-79 loading dock.
Containers are not stored
individually in the vault outside of
Stage Right Pallets. Procedures
preclude storing a damaged
container in the vault Procedures
also identify that if a container or
a pallet is damaged or dropped
while in the vault that it not be
stored in the vault.

A single loaded stage right pallet
placed on the floor will not cause
a criticality. This analysis
evaluated many more containers
in the vault than will actually be
stored and the addition of more
than one pallet will also not cause
a criticality, but would definitely
create a criticality concern.
Procedures direct that undamaged
containers are only stored in the
storage racks. If a pallet is
temporarily stored on the floor
along the way, this pallet must be
stored before another pallet is
introduced to the vault.

None Identified

vault

Containers are sucked on the
vault floor instead of in the racks.

Airplane Crash into the vault area

and create a criticality concern. A single
damaged conuiner will not cause a criticality
because the reactivity of a single unit is low.
However, storage of that conuiner in an array
is not evaluated.

If the AGV became inoperable along the way
to a rack position and a six pack had to be
placed on the floor, interim storage would be
required. Additional storage on the floor
outside of the racks is an unstudied scenario
and presents a criticality concern. Conuiners
conuining certain pits are just subcritical or
critical in infinite arrays. In either situation the
margin of safety may be reduced. Therefore,
the rack spacing is required for loaded
conuiners.

An airplane crash into the 12-66 or 12-79
facility in considered highly unlikely. The
impact would cause extreme structural
damage, crush conuiners and release of
radioactive material to the atmosphere and
change the spacing of the conuiners.

Density

No restriction on density.

Plutonium was assumed as alpha
phase plutonium at 19.82 g/cc and
Uranium as 19.05 g/cc

Fissile material with higher

density than evaluated is stored in
the vault

Storage of pits at a plutonium or uranium
density higher than that evaluated would
present an unstudied situation. This is not
likely since near theoretical density was
assumed in the evaluation.

Absorption/

Reflection

No other absorbers or reflectors
other than those specifically
evaluated are allowed stored or
suged interstitially to the vault

Additional absorbers / reflectors
added interstitially in the vault

area.

(excludes the AGV)

Only certain materials are evaluated in the
vault area. Materials placed interstitially in the
storage array (e.g., conuiners other than AL-
R8s, steel sheets or drums of beryllium) may
be safe but present an unstudied scenario.

Enrichment

No restriction on enrichment.

Plutonium was assumed as 100%
239Pu; Uranium was assumed as
93.15% 235U. None of the pits
evaluated for storage in 12-66 or
even the B83 exceed the
enrichment used in the evaluation.

Higher isotopic material than

expected (studied) conuined in an
AL-R8 and placed in vault

Pits typically conuin weapon grade plutonium

(5. % to 6% 240Pu) and Uranium (93.15%
235U). The calculation performed in this
analysis bound these enrichments.

Temperature

Heating and ventilation is

provided in Building 12-66 to
mainuin a temperature around the

Pit temperature is sufficient to

significantly degrade the celotex
in AL-R8 conuiners

The celotex is important to the reactivity to

the vault and its integrity must be maintained.
Degraded celotex beyond the amount

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degrade significantly and increase
the interaction between the pits
and increase vault reactivity _

situation.

6) Evaluation of Results

Table 2 was compiled to provide a comparison between all the pits scheduled to be stored in Building 12-66. The table
provides:

• Unit ID

• Pit ID

• Design Agency (Los Alamos Nation Laboratory or Lawrence Livermore National

• Fissile plutonium and the form (delta or alpha) ' ~

iminal outer dimensions

Laboratory)

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The Building 12-66 storage array was modeled in its entirety. No credit was taken for any structural framework and
containers were close packed along each row as well as reduced in size to account for triangular pitch. This model for the
AL-R8 was extracted from the AL-R8 SARP and reduces diameter by approximately one-third. Seventeen individual arrays
are considered along the width of the room with 10 aisles as indicated in the Preliminary Design Report. Each array is
positioned 15 feet from the south end and 90 containers long. Each vertical tier is 9 containers high with a 22 inches dead
space between the sixth and seventh container.

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Specific Weapon Pit Calculations (References 1,2 3,4,5,12)

The next series of calculation involved modeling the specific weapon pits (Table 3) slated to be stored in building 12-66
using a grouping of pits from the original FL Shipping Container SARP. This grouping was provided verbally by the author
of the FL Shipping Container SARP, Jerry Hicks, Rocky Flats, Safe Sites of Colorado and is provided below. Since the FL
container is an approved package that has undergone extensive criticality safety review of the methodology used, it was
considered acceptable to use the same methodology for this analysis.

Sample input files are provided in Appendix B and a sample output file is provided in Appendix C. Giff files that show the
vault layout are provided in Appendix D.

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neutron leakage. This version of KEN O- V I did not model the nested arrays as desired and an updated version of KENO-VI
was obtained from the code authors. _repeats the above calculation with a revised version of KJENO-VI.

This version has only limited validation and its results are provided only for comparison purposes.

3 ( Considers a full uniform spacing expansion along the length of the vault, representing the average nominal

spacing between in the AL-R8 containers.

*-*C 5

considers the full expansion along the length of the vault

takes credit for the fork lift tine slot in the back of the Stage Right pallet and

adjusts the pit location in the drums in adjacent rows) ""

9-3

This is as close to the actual configuration that can be provided by this version of the KENO-VI and should suffice as the
basis for this analysis.

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b(V\

C .considers

the same array spacing as

texcept the

Stage Right pallets are
grouped into the storage
stall configuration (two
Stage Right pallets side by
side) provided by the
storage rack. The updated
version of the KENO-VI
code was required to
perform this calculation
with array within array
capabilities.

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considers

TT O x 10 xj_planar array
(in AL-R8

Grouped Array in Building 12-66 Stalls

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6 Pack of Horizontal AL-R8 Containers
Along the Length of the Arrays -

Ungrouped Array in Building 12-66/

6 Pack of Horizontal AL-R8 Containers

Figure 4

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containers in the vertical
position with close concrete
reflection on all sides
except the ceiling. The

ceiling is considered 14 feet high backed by 1 foot of concrete. The Building 12-79 loading dock is expected to receive up to
36 AL-R8 containers in one receipt. Even if two receipts were received this model is bounding.

Certainly, ) is an accident scenario and having the entire vault filled or the loading dock filled with

these is incredibl e. How ever, these examples do demonstrate that even for such an extreme situation criticality does not
occur J

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Jwas originally obtained verbally from Charles Hills, Pantex Plant Risk Management, and later from

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b)

BuildingT2^79 Loading Dock and Interlock

Up to 36 loaded A1-R8 containers will be placed in the Building 12-79 Loading Dock area dock and palletized into 4-packs
and 6-packs prior to transfer into the interlock. This dock is not seismically qualified and could collapse during a design basis
accident. Any containers on the dock could be cru shed from falling I-beams and ceiling material. All pits in containers
evaluated thus far are safe in infinite planar array^ ^and in a single calculation presented above ( Table 5,

?If a I-beam falls onto a planar array one would expect crushed containers and crushed or damaged
pits directly under the beam and potential release of radioactive material. However, one would not expect a selective
isolation of bare pits to a common location. One would also expect the array to be randomly oriented throughout the loading
dock and certainly not oriented in a manner to produce a criticality. On the other hand if the containers are held in the Stage
Right pallet and rotated so that one pit was positioned on top of the other in the pack, an I-Beam could crush one pit into
another and produce an unanalyzed situation. This would suggest that containers on the loading dock should be:

• kept there as little time as needed to palletize and

• maintained in planar arrays and

• turned by the pallet turner only in the interlock.

The calculations presented earlier evaluated 13770 containers (Tables 4 and 5). This is significantly more than the 12440
containers that could be stored in Building 12-66. The introduction of 36 loaded containers to the Building 12-79 dock area
will have negligible effect on the storage array provided the systems v have been

evaluated and approved for storage in Building 12-66.

7) Design Features and Administratively Controlled Limits and Requirements
Design features of the facility include the following:

• The Building 12-66 facility is a robust facility designed to withstand a design basis accident (DBE, DBT).

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ECS-CSE-970009

• The AL-R8 containers were at one time certified for over the road transportation which means that they were subjected
to the rigorous testing required for DOT certification. There is not a primary containment vessel in the AL-R8 which is
one of the reasons the container lost certification.

• Pits in the AL-R8 container are supported only by the frame and the celotex. If the container is dropped and incurs
significant damage, it should not be stored in the facility without further evaluation.

• The storage racks will be designed and fabricated to seismic qualifications to withstand a Design Basis Accident (DBE,
DBT).

• The storage rack dimensions must be fabricated as described in the Preliminary Design Report and must be adhered to
for this evaluation to be valid. The AL-R8 container packaging requirements must also be adhered to for this evaluation
to be valid.

8) Summary and Conclusions

fb

A nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation was done for the Pantex Building 12-66 facility to determine if retired weapon pits
could be safely stored in the proposed storage racks. Generic pits were evaluated initially for a pr eliminary acc eptance x ^
determination for the vault. This was a very conservative look at close packed containers loaded( ^of f £

plutonium/beryllium positioned in the seventeen arrays throughout the vault. The results provided confirmation that these

r ~ _ _ . -._^ vere acceptable for storage. Next,

specific weapons pits scheduled to bcTstored m the vault were evaluated using die same conservative close packed container
model as used earlier. Weapon pits currently scheduled to be stored in the facility include: w70, b28, w48, w56, b61-0,2,5,
w68, w55, w71, w79, w44, w50, b57, w69, b43, b54, and w45. Calculations presented document that these are acceptable by
a signi fican t margin. Finally, an accident scenario of storing an incorrect pit i n the v ault was investigated. The pit selected is
' the most reactive pit (in arrays) handled at the Pantex facility.’ }was substituted into the close packed

array used in previous calculations and the reactivity increased beyond an acceptable limit. The arrays of containers were
then expanded to more closely represent the storage configuration in the vault and k-effective decreased well below an
acceptable limit of 0.95.

1

This evaluation documents that the proposed operation will be safe with a justified margin of saj(ety of greater than 0.05. The
pits acceptabl e for storage are listed in Table 2. Others could be stored afte r they are evaluated

/The Double Contingency section, Section 5), indicateslhe
necessary contfGlS that Pantex Operations should implement prior to operation to ensure criticality control is maintained.
However, this section provides a preliminary DCA to be used to identify areas of concern and should be repeated in greater
detail prior to facility startup and operation.

9) References

1) T. P. Mclaughlin, Arrays of WR Systems of Los Alamos Origin , March 14, 1994

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3)

4)

5)

6 )

7)

8 )

9)

10 )

11 )

12 )

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Containers, October 14, 1980.

2) T. P. Mclaughlin, Transport Indices (for Criticality Control) for LASL Pit* in aj os cu ■

Containers, October 14 1980 ' JOr LA * L F,ts AL-R8 Shipping

Safay N °- CrUcalU, Safe* ./,*«

^ *’• ** *•» A «**%■ „/,*«

LA2T1 V7 » Mock-up Shipment ,o Pam*.

F. E Adcock, RFE-8801, Revision October 1989, Rocky Flats Container, Model AL-R8 Safetv
Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) (U).

NUREG/CR-0200, Volumes 1,2,3, ORNL/NUREG/CSD-2; SCALE; A Modular CodeSvstem far
Performing Standardized Computer Analysis for Licensing Evaluation-, December 1984 f

N-CLC-G-00065 SCALE 4.3 Validation - Plutonium Cores With Fast to Intermediate Fission
Energies-, S. M. Revolmski, Westinghouse Savannah River Company, August 26, 1997

WSRC-SCD-3, Westinghouse Savannah River Company Nuclear Criticality Safety Manual (U)
ZZZr* WeStingh ° USe Savannah River Company Nuclear Criticality Safety Methods

Mmutes, Joe Papp, Criticality Analysis for 12-66 Pit Staging Meeting, August 26,1997

l

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b ( 2 ^

13) N-CLC-G-0047, F. E. Tmmble, SCALE Validation for WIPP; May, 1997.

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Appendix

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Appendix A: Mixtures and Compositions

MIXING TABLE

NUMBER OF SCATTERING ANGLES = 2

CROSS SECTION MESSAGE THRESHOLD =3.0E-05

MIXTURE * 1 Plutonium Metal - Alpha Phase DENSITY(G/CC) = 19.820

NUCLIDE ATOM-DENS. WGT. FRAC. ZA AWT NUCLIDE

1094239 4.99299E-02 1.00000E+00 94239 239.0526 PLUTONIUM-239

IV MAT 1264 UPDATED 08/12/94

MIXTURE = 2 Beryllium DENSITY(G/CC) = 1.8480

NUCLIDE ATOM-DENS. WGT. FRAC. ZA AWT

2004009 1.23487E-01 1.00000E+00 4009 9.0124

NUCLIDE
BERYLLIUM-9

IV MAT 1289/THRM1064

UPDATED 08/12/94

MIXTURE = 3 Carbon

NUCLIDE ATOM-DENS.
3006012 3.92503E-03

IV MAT 1274/THRM1065

3026000 8.34 982E-02

IV MAT 1192

Steel DENSITY(G/CC) = 7.8212

WGT. FRAC. ZA AWT

1.00001E-02 6000 . 12.0001

UPDATED 08/12/94
9.90000E-01 26000 55.8447

UPDATED 08/12/94

NUCLIDE
CARBON-12

IRON

MIXTURE = 4 Celotex

NUCLIDE ATOM-DENS.
4001001 7.42820E-03 6

IV MAT 1269/THRM1002

4006012 4.45690E-03 4

IV MAT 1274/THRM1065

4008016 3.71410E-03 4

IV MAT 1276

DENSITY(G/CC) = 0.19986
WGT. FRAC. ZA AWT

.21900E-02 1001 1.0077

UPDATED 08/12/94
.44367E-01 6000 12.0001

UPDATED 08/12/94
.93443E-01 8016 15.9904

UPDATED 08/12/94

NUCLIDE

HYDROGEN

CARBON-12

OXYGEN-16

MIXTURE = ‘

NUCLIDE ATOM-DENS.
5001001 1.37437E-02

IV MAT 1269/THRM1002

5008016 4.60814E-02

IV MAT 1276

5011023 1.74722E-03

IV MAT 1156

5013027 1.74537E-03

040375 (5)

5014000 1.66199E-02

IV MAT 1194

5020000 1.52055E-03

1195

5026000 3.47236E-04

IV MAT 1192

Regular Concrete DENSITY(G/CC)

2.3000

WGT. FRAC. ZA AWT

9.99867E-03 1001 1.0077

UPDATED 08/12/94
5.31997E-01 8016 15.9904

UPDATED 08/12/94
2.90003E-02 11023 22.9895

UPDATED 08/12/94
3.40003E-02 13027 26.9818

UPDATED 08/12/94
3.37003E-01 14000 28.0853

UPDATED 08/12/94
4.40004E-02 20000 40.0803

UPDATED 08/12/94
1.40001E-02 26000 55.8447

UPDATED 08/12/94

NUCLIDE

HYDROGEN

OXYGEN-16

SODIUM-23

AL-27 1193 218

SILICON

CALCIUM ENDF/B

IRON

TITLE
ENDF/B-

TITLE
ENDF/B-

TITLE
ENDF/B-

ENDF/B-

TITLE
ENDF/B-

ENDF/B-

ENDF/B-

TITLE
ENDF/B-

ENDF/B-

ENDF/B-

GP

ENDF/B-
-IV MAT
ENDF/B-

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MIXTURE =
NUCLIDE
6013027
040375(5)

6 Aluminum DENSITY(G/CC) = 2.7000

ATOM-DENS. WGT. FRAC. ZA AWT

6.02620E-02 1.00000E+00 13027 26.9818

UPDATED 08/12/94

MIXTURE =

NUCLIDE
7092235
IV MAT 1261

7092238 3.30116E-03

IV MAT 1262

DENSITY(G/CC) =
WGT. FRAC. ZA AWT

9.31500E-01 92235 235.0441

UPDATED 08/12/94
6.85000E-02 92238 238.0510

UPDATED 08/12/94

7 High Enriched Uranium
ATOM-DENS.

4.54652E-02

MIXTURE -
NUCLIDE
8092235
IV MAT 1261

8092238 4.80957E-02

IV MAT 1262

8 Depleted Uranium

ATOM-DENS.

9.76148E-05

DENSITY(G/CC) =
WGT. FRAC. ZA AWT

1.99995E-03 92235 235.0441

UPDATED 08/12/94
9.98000E-01 92238 238.0510

UPDATED 08/12/94

MIXTURE =

NUCLIDE ATOM-DENS.
9006012 3.11144E-04

IV MAT 1274/THRM1065

9014000 1.66178E-03

IV MAT 1194

9024000 1.52593E-02

Stainless Steel 316 DENSITY(G/CC) =
WGT. FRAC. ZA AWT

8.00005E-04 6000 12.0001

UPDATED 08/12/94
9.99998E-03 14000 28.0853

UPDATED 08/12/94
1.70000E-01 24000 51.9957

3 293K SIGP=5+4 RE(042375)

UPDATED 08/12/94

9025055
IV MAT 1197
9026000
IV MAT 1192
9028000

1.69906E-03

5.46740E-02

9.54318E-03

.9379

1.99999E-02 25055 54

UPDATED 08/12/94
6.54200E-01 26000 55.8447

UPDATED 08/12/94
1.20001E-01 28000 58.6872

3 293K SIGP«*5+4 RE(042375) UPDATED 08/12/94

9042000 1.21616E-03 2.50000E-02 42000 95.9402

NEWXLACS 218NGP F-l/E-M P-3 293K UPDATED 08/12/94

MIXTURE -
NUCLIDE
10023051
040375(5)

10 Vanadium DENSITY(G/CC) = S.9600

ATOM-DENS. WGT. FRAC. ZA AWT

7.04570E-02 1.00000E+00 23051 50.9416

UPDATED 08/12/94

NUCLIDE TITLE
AL-27 1193 218 GP

19.050

NUCLIDE TITLE
URANIUM-235 ENDF/B-

URANIUM-238 ENDF/B-

19.050

NUCLIDE TITLE
URANIUM-235 ENDF/B-

URANIUM-238 ENDF/B-

7.7500

NUCLIDE TITLE
CARBON-12 ENDF/B-

SILICON ENDF/B-

CR 1191 218NGP WT 1/E P

MANGANESE-55 ENDF/B-

IRON ENDF/B-

NI 1190 218NGP WT l/E P

MO (1287) SIGP=5+4

NUCLIDE TITLE
V 1196 218 GP 1/E*SIGT

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ECS-CSE-970009

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Appendix B
Sample Input Files

ECS-CSE-970009

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end data
end

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